The study constructs a linear model to evaluate the significant impacts of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on foreign direct investment (FDI) and the possible consequences of BITs. The results show that BITs have significantly promoted FDI, and their effects are substitute for the level of political risk in a country. Another interesting finding is that BITs signed with non-OECD countries should not be overlooked. By estimating the growth of FDI resulting from an additional BIT ratified, the finding further indicates that BITs are more potential for most Asian countries to promote FDI.
Introduction
Designing a favorable policy to attract foreign investors has become one of the hottest topics among developing countries. Several national and international policies which are being pursued include the removal of investment restrictions, the establishment of investment law, the establishment of commercial zones, the provision of tax holidays, bilateral agreements and economic integration. Among these policies, the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) has been witnessed on an upsurge trend in the 1990s. Figure 1 ). For instance, China, which is the first developing country to sign the greatest number of BITs since 1986, has attracted a huge amount of FDI accounting for about half of total FDI flows into Asia.
A bilateral investment treaty is generally known as an agreement between two signatory countries providing investors with fair and equitable treatment and legal protection.
The growth of BITs has been discussed actively as one of the developing countries' FDI policies in the journals of international law (eg. Salacuse, 1990 ). This has important economic implications as several studies are going on to investigate the determinants of FDI.
To date, only a few studies have been conducted solely to examine the relationship between BITs and FDI. Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2004) point out that developing countries under competitive economic pressures are rushing to sign BITs to capture the share of foreign investment. In addition, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) employ a cross-section estimation to examine the impact of BITs signed by nearly 100 developing countries with the U.S. and with OECD countries in the year 1998 , 1999 , separately. Banga (2003 investigates the impacts of national and international policies of South, East, and South-East Asian countries to promote FDI; and BITs are one of important variables in his study.
While viewed as an FDI policy to attract foreign investment, BITs have been used by developing countries in an attempt to signal multinational enterprises (MNEs) that they are committed to providing protection and guarantees. Theoretically, BITs play the role as a substitute for the quality of institutions or the political risk in a developing country. That is, riskier countries tend to absorbed more FDI inflows when their commitments to protect investors are credible. In this sense, among the three studies there is only one study whose findings are consistent with the theoretical expectation of BITs. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) are unable to provide evidence for this theoretical expectation in their study in both general and bilateral analysis of BITs with the U.S. They include 63 countries in the general analysis and 54 in the bilateral analysis; however, the regressions in their study seem to suffer from the simultaneity problem between one control variable (economic growth) and the dependent variable (share of FDI). Similar results are obtained by Hallward-Driemeier (2003) in the study of bilateral FDI flows from 20 OECD countries to developing countries in the period from 1980 to 2000.
Unlike the earlier studies, Neumayer and Spess (2005) confirm the theoretical expectation with fixed-effect regressions of FDI on the one-year lag of cumulative BITs with OECD countries. They expand the number of observations to include 119 countries.
However, the cumulative number of BITs signed among developing countries is excluded under the assumption that the amount of FDI flows between developing countries is negligible. They suggest that the studies of Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) do not generate the theoretical expectation due to the low number of observations.
In contrast, by using a sample of only 10 countries in South, East, and South-East Asia, the present study confirms the theoretical expectations of BITs. The findings suggest that BITs are more credible in a riskier country to attract FDI inflows. Using the composite political risk index in 2004, the study predicts the growth rate of FDI due to one additional BIT ratified. The results show that it is not necessary for countries such as Brunei, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan to use BITs to signal foreign investors.
As BITs between developing Asian countries dramatically rose in the 1990s, the main objective of this study is to empirically show the possible consequences of BITs. More precisely, we attempt to show that BITs signal not only bilaterally to investors of the signatory country, but also to the world business community as a whole, and to prove the theoretical expectation. Additionally, we also attempt to confirm that BITs between non-OECD countries are significant. As BITs signal to investors worldwide, the effects of BITs between non-OECD countries may not be neglected.
The remaining sections of the study are organized as follows. Section 2 provides the definition, provisions, and movement of BITs. Section 3 reviews the literature on the relationship between BITs and FDI while section 4 presents the methodology used in the study. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the findings together with policy implications.
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
Bilateral investment treaties are commonly known as agreements between two signatories in order to provide legal standards of protection for foreign investors. This legal protection is a supplementary offer provided for the signatory countries other than those specified in the national laws. Similar to the national laws, the treaty needs to be ratified to come into effect. According to Salacuse (1990) , the basic structure of any BIT encompasses eight topics: Basically, BITs vary across countries. They differ according to negotiations between countries; nevertheless, they share a common provision in which investors are entitled to fair and equitable treatment from the signatory governments. That is, there is no discrimination against foreign investors. The treatment is also applicable to the protection against expropriation and the mechanism of dispute settlement. BITs typically provide dispute resolution by an international body. That is, investors can sue the national government at the international arbitration if there is any violation of the treaty.
Historically, BITs was initiated and promoted by the capital-exporting countries. The objective was to establish an international legal framework to protect the investment of their nationals in foreign countries. On the other hand, the driving forces, at present, seem to be from the developing countries. BITs today are being promoted by developing countries as one of their investment policies. The objective of negotiating a BIT with advanced countries is to enhance the investment climate, making the countries more attractive to foreign investors by assuring investors of the government efforts to protect them.
Since the first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan, the number of BITs increased gradually, and rapidly especially in the 1990s. This trend can also be observed in some Asian nations (see Figure 2) . Before the 1990s, few developing countries signed BITs; however, there was a dramatic increase in the 1990s (see Figure 3) and BITs between developing Asian and Pacific countries accounted for the largest portion during the time.
Therefore, the effects of BITs among these countries should not be neglected.
Literature Review on BITs and FDI
Besides the characteristics of the host country per se, the government of developing countries have targeted FDI as the main factor for their economic growth. In that respect, those countries have established law of foreign investment in order to provide incentives as well as guarantees to make their countries even more attractive to foreign investors. At the same time, some countries have negotiated bilaterally with other countries to establish a legal framework aimed directly at attracting investment from the signatory countries through provision with protection and guarantees.
As various policies to attract FDI inflows have been introduced by most developing countries, several researchers have examined the role of those policies in attracting FDI (see Banga, 2003; Blonigen & Davies, 2002; Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier & Mengistae, 2004; Neumayer, 2006; Taylor, 2000) . On the other hand, there are few studies investigating the in-depth relationship between BITs and FDI, and their findings are very much controversial. UNCTAD (2003) states that there is nothing much BITs can influence the global FDI flows. However, this argument may set a gap that BITs may work in certain conditions and for specific nations and play apart as a favorable framework to welcome foreign investors. This appears to support Salacuse (1990) who argues that the adoption of a BIT by a host country is, at least, to signal the nationals of a partner country that their investments are protected and promoted.
To prove this statement, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) conducted a cross-sectional empirical analysis on the impacts of U.S. BITs and OECD BITs in developing countries.
They find a strong positive relationship between BITs and FDI from the U.S. to developing countries, but BITs with OECD counties are not significant. However, using twenty years of bilateral FDI flows from 20 OECD countries to 31 developing countries, Hallward-Driemeier (2003) finds that BITs play a minor role in stimulating greater FDI and they are only effective in countries with high quality of institutions and strong local property rights.
However, Neumayer and Spess (2005) find a completely different result suggesting that signing BITs with OECD countries is important to induce greater FDI inflows into the developing countries (see also Egger & Pfaffermayr, 2004) . Using three components of political risk index developed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), they find that a country with relatively lower institutional quality benefits more from BITs i.e. BITs act as a substitute rather than a complement to the quality of a country's institutions. However, BITs signed with developing countries are excluded in their study due to little amount of FDI flows between developing countries.
Examining BITs signed with the U.S., Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find little evidence to explain the importance of BITs signed by low and middle-income countries with the U.S. in their bilateral analysis. In the general analysis, they argue that BITs only play a major role in countries where investment environment has already been improved; their study seems to be consistent with Hallward-Driemeier (2003 
Methodology
To construct the regression models employed in the study, we initially review the theoretical and empirical arguments that specify the significant factors affecting FDI flows; thereby, the impacts of BITs on FDI can be robustly evaluated in the regressions which incorporate all the significant control variables.
Several theoretical foundations have emerged to explain the reasons why national firms turn into multinational enterprises (MNEs) and why they invest in international production rather than licensing or exporting. Under the assumption of market imperfection, Hymer (1976) stressed the firms' motives to enhance their market power as the determinants of foreign direct investment. Two main types of determinants are firms' specific advantages and removal of conflict. Based on the comprehensive analysis of ownership advantages, the advantages of locational specific endowments and the advantages of internalization, which are known as eclectic theory, Dunning (1981) argues that location specific endowments affect country or industry variables and their effect is different from the ownership advantages.
Unlike specific-firm advantages and the advantages of internalization, the locational advantages represents advantages specific to a country which are in the interests of foreign investors. Empirical frameworks have been conducted to test the attractiveness of a country or the determinants of inbound FDI.
Several country-specific variables have been considered in promoting foreign investment. While the economic and political factors are found to be significant to attract inbound FDI in various studies (Baniak, Cukrowski & Herczynski, 2005; Ok, 2004) , Root and Ahmed (1979) investigated the significance of 38 variables which are categorized into 3 groups described as economic, social, and political variables. Thus, the model formulated to investigate the determinants of inbound FDI can be written as:
FDI = f [(Economic Variables), (Social Variables), (Political Variables)]
The economic variables, social variables and political variables to be employed in this study are presented as follows:
Economic variables include market size, exchange rate, macroeconomic instability and degree of openness. Firstly, to capture the market size the study uses the natural log of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) to measure the current market size and real GDP growth to measure the potential market size (see Root & Ahmed, 1979) . It is believed that the larger the market size, the more potential investment environment to be invested by a market-seeking MNEs. Thereby, positive effects are expected for these two variables.
The second variable to be used in the economic variable category is exchange rate. Dunning and Lundan (1997) and Froot and Stein (1989) maintain that the depreciation of the host country's domestic currency reduces the cost of investment; thus, inspiring foreign acquisition of domestic firms. At the same time, exchange rate depreciation also worsens the value of the repatriated profits of foreign investors (Singh & Jun, 1995) . Therefore, the relationship between exchange rate and FDI is ambiguous. In the estimation, this variable takes the annual percentage change in real exchange rate.
The third economic variable is macroeconomic instability. Naturally, investors are reluctant to invest their capital in a country with unsound macroeconomic conditions. Hence, macroeconomic instability is expected to negatively affect FDI inflows. Inflation (CPI) can be regarded as an indicator of macroeconomic instability.
The last economic variable is trade openness. There are inconclusive findings on the relationship between the openness of a host country and inbound FDI. Mundell (1957) assumes that trade is the perfect substitute for capital movements in the absence of trade barriers. Recent studies have also proved the relationship as either substitute in the case of tariff-jumping investment or complement in the case of intra-firm trade (see Banga, 2003) . Edwards (1990) argues that opening up international trade improves the attractiveness to foreign investors. Thus, the impact of this variable is ambiguous. The variable is proxied by the ratio of trade to GDP.
Many studies have found that countries which prove lower costs of investment and operation seem to be able to absorb more FDI inflows, especially efficiency and resource-seeking FDI. The study uses three proxies to control for the social factors. First of all, real wage (constant 2000 US$) in manufacturing is used to capture the host country's labor cost. It is expected to have negative relationship with FDI inflows although controversial findings have been revealed (see Chakrabarti, 2001) . The logarithm form is taken to reduce the skewness in the distribution across countries.
The second social variable is the cost of capital. The proxy used is real interest rate (base 2000) which hypothesizes to be also negatively related with FDI inflows. The other cost related variable is the quality of infrastructure. The proxy is fixed line and mobile phone subscribers per thousands, and is expected to positively attract FDI inflows as the quality is improved (see . The use of this variable is similar to that in Quazi and Mahmud (2004) 's study.
Political instability has been found to have significant negative impact on direct investment (Singh & Jun, 1995; Quazi & Mahmud, 2004) . The present study proxies this variable with the political risk rating developed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Risk is assessed on the comparable basis on twelve component factors such as government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality (see table 3 for points given to each component). The rating ranges from a high of 100 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk). Basically, the index represents the degree of stability of a country's political condition. Therefore, the higher ratings are expected to induce greater foreign investment. In other words, the positive relationship is expected.
According to the above framework on the determinants of inbound FDI, the study constructs a linear model which incorporates two policy variables such as the membership of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the BIT variable. The former is a binary variable which equals 1 starting from the year a country is admitted to APEC membership and 0 before then. Of the main interest is the latter to be included to evaluate its partial relationship with FDI inflows. BITs hypothesize to function as a signal that the door is opened for capital inflows and they are protected. The study calculates this variable as the cumulative number of BITs ratified by a host country throughout the sample period, because the treaties are assumed to have long-term effects on FDI (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003) .
However, some already-signed
BITs not yet into force are not counted since they may not ensure any protection for investors of signatory partner countries.
The general model is written as follows:
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of real FDI inflows in country i at time t.
To convert into the real term, each country's FDI inflows over the period are deflated by US GDP deflator. The bilateral inflows are not used due to the assumption that BITs are expected to signal to not only the investors of the signatory countries, but the business community worldwide.
The independent variables include a vector of economic variables (X The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 and the correlations among variables are reported in Table 2 to check multicolinearity problems. Actually, the data of some variables in some years are missing; they are ignored in the regressions without causing any bias on the estimators in the random sample (Wooldridge, 2003) . Among the three social variables, real wage and infrastructure quality are found to be the significant determinants of inbound FDI in the sample countries while real interest rate which proxies for the cost of capital have the consistent negative relationship with FDI, but it is not statistically significant in the estimation regression. In short, the result is consistent with the fact that low labor cost in Asia is one of competitive factors in promoting FDI inflows.
Results and Discussions
Political risk rating which is used as a proxy for the political variable in this study also confirm the finding of Singh and Jun (1995) and Ok (2004) who argue that political instability is an impediment to FDI inflows. As the index measures the stability in a country, the positive coefficient implies that a more stable country seems to be competitive in receiving foreign investment. Above all, the variable capturing the effect of regional economic integration on FDI is also significant in the regression result. Thus, being a member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is attractive to foreign investors.
Regression (1.2) was estimated by excluding the insignificant variables found in
Regression (1.1). The probability of F-statistic 4 fails to reject the null hypothesis that real exchange rate, inflation, and real interest rate are not jointly significant at the 5 percent level.
In particular, the finding in Regression ( (2005)'s study. We will come to this point later when
we discuss the consequences of BITs, especially those of BITs with OECD and non-OECD countries more explicitly. Table 6 .
The statistics from the tests, both F-statistic and Chi-squares statistic, show that the random effects method is more efficient in explaining the variation of FDI. However, it is also observed that all coefficients are consistent and comparable across the three methods, except for openness which has a negative sign in the fixed effects method; however, it is insignificant. Above all, regardless of the methods used, the results confirm the theoretical expectation.
The result from the random effects estimation shows that all the control variables are consistent with the general analysis although the coefficient of OPEN is not statistically significant. In particular, the negative sign of the interaction term is consistent with the prediction of BITs that BITs are more efficient tools to strengthen the credibility of a riskier developing country's commitment to protect foreign investors. Another implication that we can derive from the result is that the effect of BITs diminishes with the political stability.
To recall, the result from Regression (1.4) in Table 4 showed that BITs signed with OECD countries are beneficial while BITs signed with non-OECD countries are of little benefit. If this is the case, why should developing Asian and Pacific countries put much effort in negotiating, signing, and ratifying BITs among countries? (see Figure 3) . China, for example, has ratified approximately 40 BITs signed with non-OECD countries among some 50 BITs ratified during the 1990s. Therefore at this stage, we examine the hypothesis of BIT theory more explicitly by separately investigating the possible consequences of BIT OECD and BIT other .
Since the random effects estimation is more efficient in the above analysis, the study reports only the results of the random effects method in Table 7 below. However, the Hausman statistic is also reported to confirm the robustness of the estimates over the estimates of the fixed effects method. Table 7 shows the conditional impacts of BIT OECD and BIT other , separately. On the whole, we can confirm the theoretical expectation only in the case of BIT other while BIT OECD works unconditionally on the political risk of a nation.
According to the result of Regression (2.4), BIT OECD is statistically significant and has the positive sign. This lends a stronger support for signing and ratifying BITs with OECD countries. The result is in line with Neumayer and Spess (2005) who find that signing more BITs with OECD countries raise the amount of FDI flows to developing countries. However, the result does not support the theoretical predictions of the role of BITs in this case. Though the coefficient of the interaction term between BIT OECD and POLRISK has the expected negative sign, it is not statistically significant. In short, the result implies that BITs with OECD countries may be effective irrespective of the political condition of a nation.
On the contrary, BITs with non-OECD countries function as a substitute for the political condition of a nation. The coefficients of BIT other and its interaction term with POLRISK have the expected sign and are significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. However, in this regression, we do not control for the effects of BIT OECD . With suspicion that BIT other is a complement to BIT OECD, Regression (2.6) shows the result with the interaction between BIT OECD and BIT other . The coefficient of BIT other is negative and significant at the 1 percent level while that of the interaction term is positive and also statistically significant. That is, BIT other seems to work; however, depending on BIT OECD or the result can be interpreted that BIT other adds more impacts to the overall effects of BIT OECD .
The results seem to contradict the fact that FDI between developing countries are rare as pointed out by Neumayer and Spess (2005) . Likewise, it sounds unusual if BITs between developing countries work. One possible explanation of the result is that signing massive
BITs with non-OECD countries is a strong signal not only to developing signatories, but to the business community worldwide of the government's commitment to provide stable legal investment framework. Therefore, their effects should not be neglected.
To sum up, the above regression results suggest that BITs are definitely a credible signal to foreign investors. In addition, we also find evidence to confirm the theoretical predictions of BITs. Although the conditional effects of BIT OECD are not significantly proved, the absolute effects are strongly found. In particular, while we find the significant substitute effects of BIT other for POLRISK and the positive interaction term between BIT OECD and BIT other , it is conclusive that both BIT OECD and BIT other are effective as complement to each other and they work not only bilaterally, but worldwide, too.
The above results have shown the significant conditional effects of BITs on FDI inflows. As Model (2) allows us to compute the growth of FDI under a specific condition of political stability, the study derived the first-order condition with respect to BIT from Model (2) which is written as follows:
Using the political risk rating in the year 2004, we estimated the ceteris-paribus effects of ratifying one additional BIT on FDI inflows into some South, East, and South-East Asian nations. Table 8 reports the results.
Column (1) and column (2) are the growth of FDI from an additional ratified BIT and BIT with non-OECD countries, respectively. The figures in column (1) were obtained by plugging the coefficients of BIT and its interaction term of Regression (2.3) into Model (3) above, and those in column (2) were calculated in the same way, using the coefficients of Regression (2.5). The t-statistic of this partial effect is calculated using the Delta method. The results indicate that the predicted FDI inflows in the year 2005 may average around 2.3 percent when a country in South, East, and South-East Asia ratifies an additional treaty, given that other factors are constant.
Among the three regions, the magnitude is higher in South Asia, averaging about 3.7 percent (see column (1)). That is, one BIT ratified by a country in South Asia significantly increase FDI inflows by 3.7 percent. Even though with some internal or external conflicts which occurred in some South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, those countries still have the potential to induce foreign investment by 3.5 and 4.1 percent, respectively through signing and ratifying one more BIT. Additionally, the t-statistics in column (2) indicate that BITs with non-OECD countries are also effective. However, the larger magnitude of 3.9 percent may incorporate the effects of BITs with OECD nations as their effects are not controlled in the regression estimation.
In East Asia, according to a rather stable political condition, an additional BIT ratified can stimulate only around 1.5 percent of FDI inflows. Among the five countries estimated in the region, the t-statistics indicate that only China and Mongolia have potential to sign BITs; however, BITs with non-OECD countries seem not be effective in all countries in East Asia.
China is able to attract around 1.9 percent of FDI with one BIT ratified. As Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) excludes China from the sample, this may lose important information of BIT effects as China was the third top country to conclude BITs as of 2000 (UNCTAD, 2000) . The implication for the insignificant effects of BITs in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea is probably that the quality of institutions and compliance of the laws are sufficiently trustworthy.
In South-East Asian countries, FDI is predicted to increase by an average of about 2 percent with an additional BIT ratified. Among them, BITs seem to have no effect in Brunei and Singapore. Like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, this also implies that the quality of institutions and the compliance of laws are good enough to ensure a safe investment in those countries. Reversely, the figures for Indonesia and Myanmar suggest that these countries have higher potential among South-East Asian countries to attract FDI inflows with an additional ratification of BIT. On the other hand, BITs with non-OECD countries are not significant in four countries including Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
Conclusions
The study analyzes the effects of bilateral investment treaties on foreign investment in Asian countries. Based on the empirical background of several studies on the determinants of FDI inflows, a linear model is constructed including the sample of 10 Asian countries from 1984 to 2002. In summary, the results robustly confirm our theoretical expectation of BIT.
By controlling for several factors discussed in the literature of foreign direct investment, this study provides evidence that BITs play a significant role in stimulating the inflows of investment. A further analysis indicates that signing a treaty with OECD countries is beneficial while signing BITs with non-OECD countries seem not to gain any significance.
The results are in line with those of Neumayer and Spess (2005) , who find significant relationship between BITs signed with OECD countries and FDI inflows.
Testing the theoretical expectation of BITs, BITs signed with OECD countries and BITs signed with non-OECD countries, the finding generally indicates that countries with higher political risk seem to be better able to receive more FDI with BIT ratification. While the effects of BITs with OECD nations are not likely to depend on the quality of political condition, those of BITs with non-OECD countries might be likely to. A further analysis indicates that the effects of BITs with non-OECD countries are complement to those of BITs with OECD countries. As BITs are viewed as the commitment of a host country to provide a stable legal framework to investors, signing BITs is a signal to not only signatory countries, but also the international business community. The results conclude that the commitment is credible even with BITs signed with non-OECD countries although conditional on BITs signed with OECD countries. Thus, a message to a developing country is that a BIT is really worth negotiating, signing, ratifying, and complying.
In addition, using 2004 political risk data, the study provides evidence that an additional BIT ratified raises FDI inflows by an average of 2.3 percent in South, East, and South-East Asian nations. It is evident that BITs are effective in most countries in Asia, but they are of little importance in Brunei, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Lastly, the overall findings in this study add to the literature on the determinants of FDI. As shown in the empirical results, the market size, political stability, the quality of infrastructure, wage, the degree of openness, APEC membership are the important factors for stimulating FDI inflows. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 
